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Abstract
We discuss the role of foreign exchange reserves as precautionary savings under an imperfect
market framework due to the presence of endogenously determined borrowing constraints. We
show that cost of holding reserves is higher in borrowing constrained economies than uncon-
strained ones as a result of the leverage e¤ect of the debt. We also argue that high global reserve
holdings can even be welfare reducing for the world economy where nancially constrained de-
veloping countries are heavy borrowers in international lending markets.
JEL Classication: F32, F34.
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1 Introduction
We examine the impact of foreign exchange reserve holdings under an imperfect market frame-
work due to the presence of borrowing constraints. We suggest that cost of reserve holdings is higher
in borrowing constrained economies than unconstrained ones as a result of the leverage e¤ect of the
debt. We also argue that high global reserve holdings can even be welfare reducing for the world
economy where nancially constrained developing countries are heavy borrowers in international
lending markets.
The last decade witnessed a substantial increase in foreign exchange reserve holdings of central
banks. The level of global reserve holdings reached to a peak of USD 7,3 billion at the end of 2008
which is around 12 percent of the world GDP (Figures 1 and 2). This surge in reserves is mainly
driven by central banks of developing countries.
Central banks prefer safe and liquid assets while building up their reserve stocks which could
cushion the shock in cases where external borrowing is either ceased or limited. Accordingly, Figure
3 reveals that a signicant portion of the international reserve stock is accumulated in US dollars
or Euros. The sizeable level of reserves points out a substantial ow of capital from developing
countries to developed areas. This reverse capital ow can be suggested as an explanation of Lucas
Paradox. Standard neoclassical theory implies that capital should move from rich to poor areas
until marginal product of capital is equalized in both. However, Lucas (1990) argues that, given the
di¤erence in return on capital, this ow is not as strong as predicted by theory. A number of studies
point to capital market imperfections as an explanation to Lucas Paradox 1. Gertler and Rogo¤
Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankas¬, Aras¸t¬rma G.M., Ulus, 06100 Ankara, Turkey. Phone : 90 (312) 507 54 72
Fax: 90 (312) 324 23 03. e-mail: kurmas.akdogan@tcmb.gov.tr. I am grateful to Yunus Aksoy, Kosuke Aoki, Gianluca
Benigno, Gülçin Özkan, seminar participants at Birkbeck College and Society for Computational Economics 2007
Montreal conference for their helpful comments. I bear sole responsibility for the views expressed in this paper.
1See Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) and Alfaro, Özcan and Volosovych (2005) for a review of this literature.
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Figure 1: Foreign Exchange Reserves
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Figure 2: Reserves as a percentage of World GDP
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Figure 3: Currency Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves (End of 2008)
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(1990) suggest that the asymmetric information problem between borrowers and lenders diverts
the capital from poor to rich countries. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) present a historical review
of countries that declared sovereign default and argue that default has further detrimental e¤ects
on the institutional build up of a country, further increasing the credit risk of that country and
thereby preventing capital inows. Similarly, Alfaro, Özcan and Volosovych (2005) emphasize the
institutional quality as a factor determining capital ows. Smaghi (2006), a member of executive
board of European Central Bank, agrees with this view and adds that:
"Improving institutions is not easy... This is why several countries have looked
for an alternative to the strengthening of institutions, consisting in accumulating large
stocks of foreign reserves. Foreign reserve accumulation has been a (partial) substitute
for institution building, with a view to increase the countrys credibility in the eyes of
foreign investors. In contrast to institution building, however, the sizable foreign reserve
accumulation has further contributed to the build-up of imbalances. Such a policy has
also been very costly to the economy, taking into account e¢ ciency losses, and is not
sustainable over time"
Taylor (2006) goes one step further and suggests that if we subtract reserves from capital inows
to emerging economies, then Lucas paradox disappears (Figure 4).
Reserve accumulation is a costly policy for two reasons. First, reserves could be used for less
liquid but more productive investment in developing countries. In addition to this opportunity
cost, under the presumption that most emerging markets are heavy borrowers in the international
market, the positive spread between borrowing rates and return on reserves is another discouraging
factor behind accumulation of reserves. Rodrik (2006) calculates the cost of holding excess reserves
as one percent of GDP for developing countries2. He argues that the costly reserve accumulation
preference of developing countries over reducing their short-term liabilities is puzzling.
2Excess reserves are dened as the amount exceeding three-months of imports.
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Figure 4: Net Capital Flows to Emerging Economies
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There are numerous empirical studies to nd the optimum level of foreign exchange reserves3,
though, less e¤ort is put on theoretical side. The main problem faced is the ad-hoc nature of foreign
exchange reserve policies of central banks. Moreover, more often than not, changes in international
reserves might be a residual of monetary policy actions, rather than a result of predetermined reserve
management policies. A point worth to highlight here is the relation between reserve volatility and
the choice of exchange rate regime. Most countries have o¢ cially adopted oating exchange rate
regimes after epidemic nancial crises of late 1990s. This would supposedly lower reserve volatility
since reserves were no longer required to support the level of exchange rate. Yet, as Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) argues, the pervasive fear of oat reveals itself in managed oating practices for
many developing countries. Many countries utilize precautionary savings argument as an ex-post
justication mechanism for the surge in reserves4. As Mishkin (2007) puts it:
However, there are costs associated with such reserve accumulation and there is
also a danger that, under the guise of "insurance," countries will engage in activities
including intervention to keep their currencies weakthat are increasingly distorting
global capital and trade ows
The adherents to this mercantilist view focus on Chinese case and argue that high reserve
holdings of China stems from the preference of a depreciated currency to sustain the export-led
growth of the country (Dooley et al, 2003)). Aizenman and Lee (2007) conduct an empirical
test for the determinants of reserve demand and suggest that only a small part of the reserve
accumulation can be explained by the mercantilist motive whereas precautionary saving motive is
3See Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), Flood and Marion (2002), Jeanne and Ranciere (2006), Aizenmann, Lee and
Rhee (2005), Bar-Ilan, Marion and Perry (2007).
4This kind of a communication policy is apparently a risky one. If central banks do not have full control over
reserves, and reserve accumulation is not a result of a precautionary policy but mostly a result of combination of
exogenous factors, then a possible reduction in the level of reserves in the future, due to a reversal of these exogenous
factors, would be hard to explain under a prudential framework.
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still the dominant factor5.
While the adequate level of reserves is still an issue under scrutiny, many developing countries
hold -and advised to hold- more reserves in the last ten years. To ll this gap of indeterminate
optimal reserve level, Guidotti (1999), ex-minister of nance of Argentina, comes up with a simple
rule for reserve management. According to this external balance rule, countries should hold foreign
exchange reserves to meet their foreign liabilities for a year. Later on, Greenspan (1999) favors
this rule and adds that such a rule could also "...limit the size of international rescue packages,
since the size of such packages is often related to the size of a countries short-term liabilities less
its reserves". Similarly, three months import rule tells that a certain amount of liquid assets is
required for a country in case of a crisis, to sustain compulsory imports (like medicine or oil) for a
certain amount of time (three months or more) until the political turbulence come to an end.
In this theoretical study, we rst highlight the connection between the traditional precautionary
saving role of foreign exchange reserves and their e¤ect in mitigating the credibility problem of
developing countries. A popular conjecture nowadays is that reserves can serve as an implicit
collateral against borrowing and lower the risk-premium associated with nancial vulnerabilities of
emerging markets. In a recent study, Levy-Yeyati (2008) argues that one point increase in foreign
exchange reserves lowers the borrowing spreads around 0.5 points in emerging markets.
We argue that the credibility enhancing role assigned to reserves is to some extent over-
emphasized in presence of endogenously determined borrowing constraints. If reserves play the
role of an implicit collateral as discussed above, then we start with the presumption that devel-
oping countries face borrowing constraints in international lending markets. Provided that these
constraints are endogenously determined by the level of net worth, then any choice that a¤ects the
evolution of the net worth of the country, such as an ad-hoc reserve policy, might in turn intensify
the level of market imperfections in an intertemporal manner.
We develop a model that is similar to Kiyotaki (1998) to examine the impact of reserve hold-
ing under an imperfect capital market framework due to the presence of borrowing constraints.
Kiyotaki constructs a model with a propagation mechanism where small sectoral shocks amplify,
persist and generate larger aggregate shocks. The core of his model includes endogenously deter-
mined credit constraints which deteriorates the credit ow from the relatively unproductive agents
to the productive ones. As a result of the commitment problem, all borrowing between productive
and unproductive agents takes place against collateral which is a part of the future returns from
investment. The level of market imperfection (degree of credit constraints) is determined endoge-
nously by two factors: the level of the productive countrys share in the world and the di¤erence
in productivity level of countries. Productive agents facing a binding constraint provide all of their
net worth to nance the gap between the investment and borrowed amount. A higher net worth
lowers the severity of the constraints and leads to a higher return in the next period. He shows
how a small temporary productivity shock amplies through the leverage e¤ect and in turn results
in lower output and growth for the economy.
Kiyotaki (1998) model ts our framework for three important reasons. First, many emerging
market countries are nancially constrained in international lending markets, despite their high
borrowing requirements. A solution to this friction is to provide collateral against borrowing.
Reserves - provided that they are going to be used in a crisis- are a part of the net worth which
5Calvo and Talvi (2006) argues that this is even true for China, the largest international reserve holder in the
world in the last years. They tell that China will eventually liberalize its banking system in line with World Trade
Organization rules. Yet, many banks might face a high ratio of non-performing loans as a result of their signicant
lending to bankrupt state owned enterprises so far. Therefore, if Bank of China prefers to bailout weak banks in such
a case, it is a prudent policy to stock up liquid reserves.
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can be used as a collateral6. However, foreign exchange reserves are usually low return instruments
with high liquidity. Holding excess reserves leaves fewer resources for investment every period
for productive country and therefore a¤ects the evolution of the share of its net worth in world
economy. This a¤ects borrowing constraints in an endogenous framework and, in turn, might result
in lower output and growth rates. We compare cases with and without borrowing constraints and
show that the cost of holding reserves is higher in a constrained economy than an unconstrained
one, as a result of the leverage e¤ect.
One di¤erence between our approach and existing literature on foreign exchange reserve demand
is that we focus on borrowing constraints that a developing country faces at non-sudden stop times.
Many studies model sharp capital reversals as tightening of (or binding) borrowing constraints for
developing countries7. These sudden stops lead to signicant reversals in current account, sharp
declines in aggregate output and consumption, corrections in asset prices and relative prices of
tradable to non-tradable goods (Mendoza, 2006). The countries that experienced sudden stops
accumulate reserves as a war chest under consumption smoothing motive under this framework.
However, sudden stops are not the only source of binding borrowing constraints. Credit constraints
faced by developing countries are an intrinsic characteristic of the international lending market
structure at normal (non-sudden stop) times. In a world, where governments of the developing
countries have e¤ectively acted as nancial intermediaries, channeling domestic saving away from
local uses and into international capital markets (Bernarke, 2005) through reserve holdings, en-
dogenously determined borrowing constraints exacerbate this reverse north-south lending. In this
line, we focus on the role of reserve accumulation in determining the evolution of net worth, and
in turn the severity of the constraints, in an endogenous framework, even when there are no sharp
capital reversals.
Mendoza (2006) argues that the amplication mechanism due to credit constraints helps to
produce sudden stops in real business cycle models. A binding constraint due to a sudden stop
results in liquidation of assets, which in turn causes a decline in their prices and further tightens
the borrowing constraint. The amplication of this e¤ect is similar to Fishers (1933) debt-defation
mechanism which results in large drops in investment and output. Precautionary savings help to
smooth consumption by preventing sharp drops and reducing the probability of these rapid capital
reversals. However, probability of sudden stops is still positive in the long-run despite precautionary
savings.
Using a similar framework, Durdu et al. (2008) examine impacts of nancial globalization,
sudden stops and output variability on the demand for foreign exchange reserves under two di¤er-
ent preference specications. Their results suggest a positive impact of nancial globalization in
addition to sudden stops on reserve demand while the relationship between output variability and
reserves is not signicant. The e¤ect of credit constraints on producing sudden stops di¤ers under
alternative specications of time preference in their study.
Caballero and Panageas (2008) argue that if a country can identify variables that are correlated
with sudden stops, then it can reduce the cost of reserve accumulation through engaging in con-
tingent contracts which provide insurance at rapid reversals of capital ows. They picture reserve
6An alternative to using reserves in case of a crisis is default, if the latter one seems less costly at the time of
the crisis. We assume that emerging countries are aware of the fact that a default has further detrimental e¤ects
for credibility and institutions, as stated in Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004). They care about their reputation and are
reluctant to be out of international borrowing system. Therefore, instead of assuming an outsider supranational legal
authority (as in Gertler and Rogo¤ (1990) or as discussed in Feldstein (1999)) we assume an implicit enforcement
constraint as in Kehoe and Perri (2002), which tells at any period the country always chose his current situation
relative to the autarky situation.
7See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Arellano and Mendoza (2002), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004),
Mendoza (2006), Durdu et al. (2008) or Caballero and Panageas (2008).
6
accumulation as a costly choice for a nancially constrained country that has higher expected future
income. However, their focus is on the portfolio decision rather than examining the endogenous
e¤ect of reserve accumulation on net worth.
The second motivation for our model choice is that, as we picture in Figure 3, foreign exchange
reserves of the developing countries are mostly held in US dollars or Euros. This suggests a capital
ow from developing countries with high productivity levels to the relatively unproductive devel-
oped countries, corroborating with Lucas paradox (Figure 4). In our model, we have productive
and unproductive countries to model this north-south lending behavior. The external nance re-
quirement of productive ones is met by the funds from unproductive ones in equilibrium, which is
guaranteed by a Markov-switching assumption on productivity levels. Moreover, we introduce an
ad-hoc reserve policy to this framework. We assume that productive ones have to hold bonds of the
unproductive ones every period with a certain proportion of their net worths. These bonds work as
reserves in our framework. Therefore, in addition to the commitment problem between borrowers
and lenders, reserve policy also act as a factor that intensies borrowing constraints in a dynamic
manner.
In our study, we prefer a deterministic framework to capture the e¤ect of an ad-hoc reserve
policy rather than determining the optimal level of reserves under a stochastic framework8. Our
interest lies in the e¤ect of credit constraints to a given reserve policy rather than searching for
the optimal level. Our ad-hoc reserve policy choice can be motivated by following suggestions of
exogenous external balance rules such as Guidotti-Greenspan rule or three months import rule9.
Third, as exposed in Figure 2, todays level of international reserves is high enough to a¤ect the
world output and is one of the candidates for the determinants of global imbalances in the last years.
Therefore, rather than picturing the model with a country and rest of the world (or investors), we
assume that the world is populated by two kinds of agents, productive and unproductive ones.
Productive ones, which are supposed to be borrowers, are credit constrained, so they hold bonds
of unproductive ones, which works as reserves in our framework.
Aizenman et al. (2005) present a two country model where the second country is subject to
credit ceilings as a result of the probability of an output shock. Again, similar to our framework,
a proportion of assets (excluding reserves) can be seized by lenders. The agent chooses the level
of debt and reserves to maximize consumption. Then, after the realization of shock the country
decides whether to default or not. They show that reserve demand goes up with the use of reserves
in reducing the probability of a crisis and alleviating the credit ceiling that the country faces.
Next section demonstrates the model and results. Third section examines dynamics. Fourth
and the last section concludes10.
8See Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), Flood and Marion (2002), Aizenman and Marion (2003) and Jeanne and
Ranciere (2006) for determination of optimal reserves within a stochastic model.
9As explained in the paragraph, we take the reserve policy as deterministic and refrain from specifying any re-
lationship between precautionary savings and borrowing constraints. Yet, there is also a literature examining the
e¤ects of borrowing constraints on precautionary savings. Technically, precautionary saving behavior in response to
uncertainly is captured by the convexity of the marginal utility function or a positive third derivative (Leland (1968),
Sandmo (1970)). Moreover, recent studies show that existence of liquidity constraints increase precautionary savings
(Deaton (1991), Xu(1995), Caroll and Kimball (2001)). Aiyagari (1994) argues that the existence of borrowing con-
straints may lead to precautionary savings behavior regardless of a positive third derivative. Caroll (2001) argues that
most important factor behind precautionary savings is the average degree of impatience rather borrowing constraints.
Impatient consumers prefer current consumption to future consumption. Without any borrowing constraints, they
would like to borrow from the future and consume today or use their existing assets. However, introduction of
uncertainty and borrowing constraints may lead to precautionary savings for prudent consumers.
10A detailed appendix is available from the author upon request.
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2 Model
The model is similar to Kiyotaki (1998)11. The world economy consists of two countries,
country A and country B. There are two goods in each country, a consumption good and a capital
good. Capital good can be turned into a consumption good one-to-one. Representative agent of
country A chooses a consumption plan fct+ig1i=0 to maximize:
1X
i=0
i ln(ct+i);  2 (0; 1) (1)
where ct+i is the consumption at date t + i. Similarly, representative agent of country B chooses
consumption plan

c0t+i
	1
i=0
to maximize:
1X
i=0
i ln(c0t+i) (2)
Both agents have constant returns to scale production functions. The productivity level of
the agent in country A is higher than that of the country B. The productive agent in country A
produces according to:
yt+1 = kt (3)
which implies that kt unit of capital good at period t turns into yt+1unit of output at t + 1 with
productivity rate . Similarly, production function of the unproductive agent of country B is
specied as:
y0t+1 = k
0
t (4)
where  >  > 1:
We introduce shifts between productive and unproductive states for both agents into the model.
We assume that an agent who is productive this period may become unproductive next period with
probability  whereas an unproductive agent may become productive next period with probability
n. This assumption helps to di¤erentiate distribution of productive countries from distribution of
wealth in the world and guarantees the credit ow from the relatively unproductive countries to the
productive ones in steady state equilibrium. The initial ratio of the population of the productive to
unproductive agents is assumed to be n : 1 and constant over time. We also impose the following
condition stating that the probability of shifts between states is not too large:
 + n < 1 (A1)
Capital depreciates fully both for productive and unproductive country:
kt = it (5)
k0t = i
0
t (6)
where it and i0t are the investment for productive and unproductive countries respectively.
There is a one period credit market where one unit of capital good this period can be exchanged
for rt = 1 +Rt units of goods next period. Agents take the interest rate rt as given.
11We also beneted from the lecture notes of Kiyotakis Advanced Macroeconomics class in London School of
Economics at 2004.
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Our interest lies in the e¤ect of an ad-hoc reserve policy of the productive country to the
aggregate output in the world economy. To capture this behavior, we separate the total borrowing
of productive agents in two parts:
bt = b
hl
t   blht (7)
where bhlt denotes the amount productive agent borrows from unproductive agent and b
lh
t denotes
the amount productive agent lends to unproductive agent12. Positive values of bhlt and b
lh
t indicate
that both countries borrow and lend from each other at the same period. Unproductive agents
insure themselves by holding bonds of unproductive agents. Therefore, blht is interpretable as foreign
exchange reserves13.
Productive agents have labor-specic technology. This results in a commitment problem be-
tween borrowers and lenders. If the agent stops working at any point of the production process,
lenders can only conscate  portion of total returns. This commitment issue puts a limit to the
borrowing for the agent. He has to provide full collateral for the amount he borrowed. Yet, only
the seizable  portion of the return works as a collateral while borrowing. Therefore, the credit
constraint of the productive agent of country A is given by:
bhlt+1   blht+1  yt+1 (8)
In equation (8) left hand side is the net debt repayment of the agent next period and yt+1 is the
collateralizable part of the investment of the production agent.
Since reserves (blht+1) are characterized as guaranteed bonds, they are also taken as collateral in
our model. Therefore, for each bond that is hold as reserves, borrowing of the productive agent
can increase. This is expressed with rewriting (8):
bhlt+1  yt+1 + blht+1 (9)
To incorporate a deterministic reserve policy choice to the model, we assume that productive
agents hold a certain proportion of their net worth as reserves every period:
blht+1 = 
at (10)
where at is the net worth which equals output less of debt repayment:
at = yt   (bhlt   blht ) (11)
As we discuss in the motivational part of the study, we concentrate on the e¤ect of an ad-hoc
constant reserve policy on a credit constrained country, rather than searching for an optimal level
of reserves. Also, as mentioned before, more often than not central banks of developing countries
justify their reserve levels with ad-hoc simple rules, such as three months imports rule or Guidotti-
Greenspan rule which tells that reserve level of a country should meet short-term debt for a year.
We take these rules as given and compare this reserve policy under capital markets with and without
borrowing constraints.
We assume that the part of the return that the productive agent can provide as collateral is
lower than unproductive agents productivity level14:
 <  (A2)
12h stands for productive (high), l stands for unproductive (low).
13We assume exchange rate equal to 1 for simplicity.
14This assumption is required when we examine the dynamics of the borrowing constrained economy in the next
section. If the interest rate is equal to the unproductive agents productivity rate, then this assumption is required
for bounded borrowing level for the productive agent.
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The ow of funds constraint of the productive agent is:
ct + kt +
blht+1
rt
  blht = yt +
bhlt+1
rt
  bhlt (12)
In (12) left hand side is the total expenditure on consumption, investment or reserves. Right hand
side is output plus new borrowing minus debt repayment. Therefore, consumption and investment
is nanced by income and new borrowing net of debt repayment.
Similar to (12), the ow of funds constraint of the unproductive agent is:
c0t + k
0
t +
(
b0hlt+1
rt
  b0hlt
)
= y0t +
(
b0lht+1
rt
  b0lht
)
(13)
where bond-market clearing requires that:
blht =  b0lht and bhlt =  b0hlt (14)
At period t, representative agents of country A and country B chooses in between consump-
tion, investment, borrowing or saving (holding reserves), respectively,

ct; kt; b
hl
t+1; b
lh
t+1; yt+1
	
and
c0t; k0t; b0hlt+1; b0lht+1; y0t+1
	
to maximize the discounted expected utility (1), with respect to production
functions (3), (4), ow of funds constraints (12), (13) and borrowing constraint (8).
The equilibrium in the market is satised when aggregate levels of consumption and investment
(capital) of both types of agents is equal to the total output of the economy. Aggregating sums of
(12) and (13) yields:
Ct + C
0
t +Kt +K
0
t = Yt + Y
0
t =Wt (15)
where capital letters denote the aggregate levels in the economy. Wt is the aggregate wealth level
in the world at time t.
First, we work through the case where there are no borrowing constraints and no reserve policy.
Second we add the borrowing constraint (still no reserves) and show that the growth rate of the
whole economy is smaller than the unconstrained economy. These two cases are similar to Kiyotaki
(1998). Then, we add an ad-hoc reserve policy to this basic model, examine comparative statics
and e¤ects of this policy on the evaluation of output and growth rate of the economy.
2.1 Case 1: No borrowing constraint and no reserves
First, we present the economy with no borrowing constraints and no reserve policy. Absent any
borrowing constraints, the representative agent maximizes (1) with respect to the ow of constraint
(12) and production function (3). In a competitive credit market the rate of interest would be
equal to the rate of return on investment of productive agents.
rt =  (16)
Unproductive agents prefer to lend all their resources to productive ones since the return is
greater than the return of their own investment. As a result, in an economy with no borrowing
constraints only productive agents invests.
As a result of log utility specication, both productive and unproductive agents consume a
constant (1  ) fraction of their net worth:
ct = (1  )at , c0t = (1  )at (17)
10
Figure 5: A Summary of the Economy with and without Borrowing Constraints
q* q** 10
Credit constraint is
binding. Both
productive and
unproductive agents
invest.
rt =γ
Credit constraint is
binding, but only the
productive agents
invest.
g < rt = αθ(n+1)< a
Credit constraint is
not binding, and
only the productive
agents invest.
rt =α
1-st(1-st)(γ/α)
In aggregate level, output and investment are independent of the distribution of wealth between
productive and unproductive agents. The growth rate in this unconstrained economy will also be
independent of this and be equal to the constant:
Gfbt =
Wt+1
Wt
=
Kt+1
Kt
=  (18)
2.2 Case 2: Borrowing constrained economy with no reserves
We now present the economy with borrowing constraints. Remember from equation (8) that 
level tells us how tight is the constraint. Accordingly, we can summarize our constrained economy
consisting of three regions depending on the magnitude of :
a) The constraint (8) may not bind and still only the productive agents invest ( > )
b) The constraint binds ( < )
i) but still only productive agents invests ( <  < )
ii) unproductive agents also invests. ( < )
Figure 5 displays a summary of the economy. The level of interest rate and critical levels of 
that satises these three cases above in the gure are presented along the unit line. We examine
each case separately below.
2.2.1 Case 2a: The constraint does not bind ( > )
If  is high enough, then the constraint does not bind, i.e.:
bhlt+1   blht+1 < yt+1 (19)
The equilibrium will be the same with the unconstrained Case 1 that is discussed above and the
interest rate is again given by (16). Let us call this critical  level as . As can be seen from
Figure 5, the critical level in log utility specication is:
 = 1  st (20)
where:
st =
At
Wt
(21)
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is the ratio of productive agents net worth (At) in total wealth in the economy (Wt) (Note that (At)
can be found by aggregating (11)). The higher the ratio of the net worth of productive country in
the economy (st), the lower is the critical level below which the borrowing constraint is binding.
This is intuitive, because the higher is this ratio, the higher net worth they can provide and even
a very low  level will not result in a credibility problem.
2.2.2 Case 2b: The constraint binds (  :)
When the constraint binds, two cases are possible. If  is very low, then the amount that
productive agents can borrow at aggregate level is very low. So, unproductive agents will remain
with extra goods in their hands. This causes unproductive ones to invest in equilibrium as well.
Therefore, we can argue that there exists a low  level under which unproductive agents also
invests. However, if  <  < , then the constraint is still binding but unproductive agents do
not invest in equilibrium.
We analyze these cases in detail. But, rst lets write the borrowing constraint (8) as an equality,
namely:
bhlt+1   blht+1 = yt+1: (22)
plugging this into the ow of funds constraint (12) yields:
kt =
yt  
 
bhlt   blht
  ct
1  rt
(23)
Equation (23) describes the investment behavior of the productive agent, when the constraint
binds. The minus term in the denominator reects the present value of the return that can be
provided as collateral. Then the denominator as a whole is the required down payment for one unit
of investment. Numerator is net worth minus consumption. Note that reserves that are carried
from last term, blht , is part of the net worth this term. According to equation (23), productive
agent provides all its net worth excluding his consumption, to nance the gap between the unit
cost of investment and collateralizable return. The higher the net worth, the higher collateral you
can provide and the higher you can borrow. Moreover, the lower the interest rate, the higher is the
investment of the productive agent. Also, (23) indicates that a positive kt requires
 < rt (24)
which is guaranteed by assumption (A2)15.
Case 2b-i:  is so low that unproductive ones also invest (  ) The investment of the
productive agent is given by the equation (23). As we discussed, a very low  means that only a
small proportion of the goods can be lent to productive agents, so unproductive agents will remain
with goods at their hands and they decide to invest. This critical level of  is found as
 < (1  st)

=  (25)
as can be seen in Figure 5. The higher the productivity level of the productive agent, the lower the
critical level . Again, a lower , a higher  and a st level means a lower . Interest rate will fall
to the level of the productivity of unproductive agents.
15Note that, rt should always be greater than or equal to , otherwise both productive and unproductive agents
would prefer to borrow but there is no one to invest. Therefore, in a competitive credit market interest rate rises.
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rt =  (26)
The ow of funds constraint turns into:
yt+1   (bhlt+1   blht+1) = +(yt  

bhlt   blht

  ct) (27)
where:
+ =
(1  )
1  
>  (28)
is the rate of return on saving for productive agents, which is greater than  as a result of lower
interest rate compared to the unconstrained equilibrium.
The growth rate of the constrained economy can be written as a function of the share of the
net worth of productive agents in total net worth (st).
Gct =
Wt+1
Wt
= 
"
 + (  )
 
1
1  
!
st
#
(29)
Note that growth rate of the constrained economy (29) is smaller than the growth rate of the
economy without borrowing constraints in (18).
The evolution of the net worth of productive agents is described by:
st+1 =
(1  )+st + n(1  st)
+st + (1  st)  f(st) (30)
Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the share of the net worth of productive agents. The black line
(M = 1) is the evolution of the share of the net worth of productive agents as given in equation
(30). It converges to a unique steady state s16 . Net worth increases at a decreasing rate as s
grows which implies concavity in Figure 6.
Plugging the steady state value into equation (25) the critical value is obtained as:
 =

(  ) +  (1 + n) (31)
Equation (30) implies another important point. When the share of the productive agent in
whole economy (st ) is big enough, the critical level  (25) may go down below , therefore the
agent may leave the credit constrained region. We will also show in Case 3 that that holding
reserves both lowers the increasing pace of st and increases the critical level  at every point.
Case 2b-ii: The constraint is binding, but still only productive ones invest ( <  < )
This is the middle region in Figure 5 where  <  < . In this region, the constraint is still
binding but unproductive agents do not invest in equilibrium17. However, they also cannot lend all
their resources to unproductive agents from , because of lack of full commitment. Therefore, to
make sure that the productive agent pays back, they lower the interest rate. But, again this will
be a higher interest rate than  in order to ensure that unproductive agents prefer lending over
16This curve is similar to Figure 1 in Kiyotaki (1999). We will compare it with the reserve holding case (where
0 M < 1) in Case 3.
17 In fact, for analysing the reserve holding case, we will mainly focus on the previous case where unproductive ones
also invest (where  < ), however, we should discuss about this middle region case for the sake of completeness.
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Figure 6: Evolution of the Net Worth Share of the Productive Agents
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investing. Therefore, we will have  < rt < . The interest rate level in the middle region, where
borrowing constraint binds but still only productive agents invest, is:
rt =

1  st (32)
The share of the net worth is a constant in this region
st+1 = st = s
 = (1  ) (1  )  n
Therefore the interest rate will be:
rt =

    (1     n)
The interest rate is between,  and . Note that, interest rate is a function of  in this region. We
have ddrt > 0 which implies that higher the , higher the interest rate.
2.3 Case 3: Borrowing constraint and an ad-hoc reserve policy
After presenting the e¤ect of borrowing constraints on the output, we incorporate the ad-hoc
reserve policy as given in (10). We assume that after the borrowing takes place, the agent holds
(1  M) fraction of the amount he can spend on investment as reserves every period, therefore

 = (1 M). Moreover, the unproductive country is not allowed to lend these resources back to
the productive country in the same period, so has to invest itself.
This saving policy is somewhat representative of benchmark rules of most central banks nowa-
days, as explained in the second section. It captures the behavior of the central banks which are
trying to keep i) reserves to GDP ratio, ii) reserves to imports ratio or iii) reserves to debt ratio
(Greenspan-Guidotti rule), constant. For the second one of these rules, imports can be thought at
a constant share of consumption or net worth. The last one could be motivated via the borrowing
process in our model that takes place against collateral which is a constant fraction  of net worth.
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Incorporating this reserve policy into the model, (23) turns into:
Kt =
MAt
1  
(33)
The critical level becomes:
 < (1 Mst)

=  (34)
Comparing (34) with (25) we see that the higher the reserve holdings the higher the critical level
of . This is intuitive because higher reserve holding means lower net worth for the productive
agent, which means that he can provide less of a collateral. Therefore, a higher  level is required
for the economy to be in the unconstrained region again.
The growth rate of the whole economy under reserve holding is:
GRt =
Wt+1
Wt
= 
"
 + (  )
 
1
1  
!
Mst
#
(35)
The evolution of net worth of productive agents is characterized as:
st+1 =
(1  )+Mst + n(1 Mst)
+Mst + (1 Mst)  f
R(st) (36)
The critical value using steady state level of s is:
R =
 (1 M +M)
( M) + M (n+ 1) (37)
We summarize characteristics of the constrained economy with the ad-hoc reserve holding policy
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the productive agent holds reserves in the credit constrained region where  < :
i) Steady state level is smaller compared to no reserve holding case.
ii) Growth rate of the economy is slower compared to no reserve holding case.
iii) Critical value of the  level is higher compared to no reserve holding case.
Proof. See Appendix.
We picture the evolution of share of the net worth in the graph for both cases in Figure 6. The
black curve is for no reserve holding case and the dashed curve is for positive reserve case where
0 < M < 1. Note that the dashed curve with positive reserve level is lower than the black curve
with no reserves at every point18.
18Log-linearizing equation (36):
est+1 = estM (1  )+   n  s(+   )	
[sM(+   ) + ]
We check two extreme situations for M . If M = 1 where no reserves are hold we have
@est+1
@est

M=1
=
(1     s)+ + (s  n)
[s(+   ) + ]
We know that 1    < s < n. Therefore, as s goes up, the numerator goes down and the denominator goes up,
therefore growth rate will decrease. This can be seen by the concavity of the black line in Figure 6.
If M = 0 where productive agents make no investment and hold everything in terms of reserves then the growth
rate is zero. The share of the productive agent remains the same at the lowest level n, which is depicted by the
horizontal line.
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Proposition 1 explains the impact of reserve holding in a credit constrained economy where the
degree of constraints is determined endogenously. There are three e¤ects which reinforce each other,
as a result of leverage e¤ect of the debt. First, as a result of transfer of funds from productive to
unproductive agents, the steady state level of the share of productive ones net worth in the economy
is smaller and its growth rate is lower compared to no reserves case. Second, as a result of lower
leverage, productive agents can provide less collateral and therefore the critical level of , where
they are not credit constrained anymore, goes up. This is important because in an economy where
there are productive agents and unproductive agents, we expect resources to go to productive
ones, so the share of productive ones grow and at some point in future, the share of productive
ones are high enough that they are not credit constrained anymore. However, a positive reserve
policy delays this process. Third, the growth rate of the whole economy is lower.
In the next section we see dynamics of the system more clearly.
3 Dynamics
To analyze aggregate dynamics, we calibrate the dynamic system consisting of aggregated
choice variables fCt; Kt; C 0t; K 0tgand state variables

Kt 1; K 0t 1
	
where19:
eCt = ck eKt 1 + ck0 eK 0t 1t (38)eC 0t = c0k eKt 1 + c0k0 eK 0t 1t (39)eKt = kk eKt 1 + kk0 eK 0t 1t (40)eK 0t = k0k eKt 1 + k0k0 eK 0t 1 (41)
The parameters we use in calibration is given in Table 1 and selected as follows: The productivity
rate of the productive agents, , is taken as 1:06 which equals one plus the average GDP growth
rate for 2007 for ve selected developing countries: Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Korea and Turkey
(see Table 2). The productivity rate of the unproductive agents, , is taken as 1:03, which equals
one plus the GDP growth of high income countries dened under World Bank classication. The
discount rate, , is 0:97 which equals 1=. The  parameter for Markov-switching assumption and
the initial ratio of the population of the productive to unproductive agents, n, are 0:45 and 0:35,
respectively. These two numbers are chosen such that  + n = 0:61 < 1, so the rst assumption
holds20. Accordingly, to ensure a steady state we chose  = 0:74. Then,  = 0:75 by (25) so  <
 and we are in the region where both productive and unproductive agents invests. This makes
 = 0:78 < , so the second assumption also holds.
Table 1: Parameter Values
 = 1:06  = 1:03
 = 1= = 0:97  = 0:45
n = 0:35  = 0:74
We compare impulse responses to a positive productivity shock on the aggregate levels of con-
sumption, capital and wealth for three di¤erent reserve holding ratios. As a benchmark, we assume
19We have used Harald Uhligs toolkit and the companion paper Uhlig (1999) both of which can be obtained from
his website at http://www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wpol/html/toolkit.htm.
20Remember that we need this assumption to guarantee a steady state where the capital ow from the unproductive
agents to the productive ones are sustained in steady state. However, results of the impulse response analysis are
very sensitive to the selection of these two parameters.
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that ten percent of the net worth is held as reserves, M = 0:9 (or R = 1 M = 0:1 in the notation
of the Figure 6). We chose this level because as shown in Figure 2, around ten percent of the world
GDP is held as reserves. Then, we reduce the reserve ratio to 9 and 8:5 percent of the net worth
level and compare the e¤ect of the shock on these alternative reserve policy specications21.
Table 2: Average GDP growth rates for 2007 (percent)
Chile 5
Argentina 9
Brazil 5
Turkey 4
Korea 5
(Average) 6
High Income Countries (Average) 3
Source: World Bank, World Economic Indicators
Figure 7 illustrates impulse responses to a positive shock to productivity in C;C 0;K;K 0 andW .
The y-axis gives the percentage deviation from the steady state due to a one standard deviation
shock to . The x-axis gives the periods after the shock. As a result of the Markov-switching
assumption, impulse responses are very sensitive to the selection of parameters. The straight line
shows the case for reserve ratio of ten percent for all graphs. When we reduce the reserve ratio
to nine percent, which is depicted by the line with squares, the e¤ect of a shock decreases on
aggregate level of consumption for the productive agent, increases on the consumption level of the
unproductive agent, yet positive for both reserve ratios. However, a further half point reduction in
reserve ratio to 8.5 percent changes the sign of the e¤ect on aggregate consumption levels for both
agents, as depicted by the dashed line. A similar sign change also happens for the aggregate wealth
of the economy, w shown in the fth graph.
Impulse responses are more consistent for aggregate capital levels. The impulse response to a
one standard deviation technology shock is positive on the capital level of productive agents, K,
and negative on the capital level of unproductive agents, K 0. Moreover, the lower is the reserve
ratio, the lower is the e¤ect of the shock on capital level for both type of agents. However, as
discussed above, in general responses are very sensitive to a small change in the chosen parameters
 and n22.
4 Conclusions
In this study, we discuss the role of foreign exchange reserves under imperfectly functioning
capital markets on account of the presence of borrowing constraints. Reserves act as an implicit
collateral against borrowing for nancially constrained developing economies in international lend-
ing markets. We develop a model where holding foreign exchange reserves indicate a transfer of
21The coe¢ cients ck, c0k0 , kk, are positive. Moreover, the Markov switching assumption (A1) ensures that ,
c0k, c0k, kk0 , k0k are also positive. The sign of k0k0 term depends on the initial ratio of the population of the
productive to unproductive agents, n, as well as other parameters.
22For example, if the reserve level satises
R  1  (   ) 
p
 (   )
 ((1  )(1  ) + n)
then a positive shock on  will still have positive e¤ect on the aggregate level of capital of the unproductive agents,
K0, but the e¤ect will be decreasing in reserve level.
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses of Aggregate Variables to a Shock in Productivity Level  under Alternative
Reserve Policies
Note: Y-axis gives the percentage deviation from steady state. X-axis gives the period after the shock.
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resources from productive to unproductive areas, which conrms the Lucas paradox. We assume
a reserve accumulation policy and examined e¤ects of this policy on aggregate macroeconomic
variables in the world economy.
We rst show that reserve holding lowers the growth rate in global terms, since reserves are
transferred resources from productive areas to unproductive ones. Second, we show that the reserve
holding policy have di¤erent impacts in a borrowing constrained economy than an unconstrained
one. In our economy the level of capital market imperfection (degree of credit constraints) is
determined endogenously by two factors: the level of the productive countrys share in the world
and the di¤erence in productivity level of countries. We compare the evolution of the share of
productive agents under credit constraints, with and without the reserve policy. As a result of
leverage, reserve holding both lowers the pace of increase in share of productive agents in the
economy and increases the critical level of . This is important because in an economy where there
are productive agents and unproductive agents, we expect resources to go to productive ones, so
the share of productive ones grow and at some point in future, the share of productive ones are high
enough that they are not credit constrained anymore. However, a positive reserve policy delays
this process.
Our results contribute to an existing literature that describes the suboptimality of reserve
accumulation process in developing countries. Caballero and Panageas (2008) agree that reserve
accumulation is costly for developing countries that are already constrained nancially. They
recommend use of contingent hedging instruments that would insulate the developing countries
from sharp capital reversals. Mendoza et al. (2007) and Durdu et.al (2008) argues that nancial
globalization is the main determinant of the surge in reserve holdings rather than a motivation to
smooth consumption against cyclical volatility since the latter is not supported by empirics.
We exempted from exchange rate uncertainty in our framework, which could be of interest for
further studies. Exchange rate level a¤ects the value of reserves and is taken into account under
a portfolio management framework. Moreover, while a signicant number of developing countries
chose more exibility in exchange rate o¢ cially, many of them engage in managed oating to
avoid volatility in exchange rates. Central banks require reserves for announced or unannounced
interventions for this purpose as well. These could be taken as a separate determinant of foreign
exchange reserve demand of the developing countries from precautionary savings against sudden
capital reversals.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
i) It is enough to show that the identity in equation (36) is smaller than the one in (21).
Simplifying we get:
st
+ (1 M) ( + n   1) < 0
This always holds since by Assumption 1 we have  + n < 1 and 0 < M < 1:
ii) Since 0 < M < 1 we have GRt > G
c
t by comparing (35) and (29)
iii)We want to show that the level of R in equation (37) is greater than 
 level in equation(31).
Simplifying we get:
 (1 M) [(  ) (1  ) + n] > 0
This is always true since 0 < M < 1 and  > :
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